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Does Pornography Presuppose Rape
Myths?
Abstract
Rae Langton and Caroline West have argued that pornography silences women
by presupposing misogynistic attitudes, such as that women enjoy being raped.
More precisely, they claim that a somewhat infamous pictorial, “Dirty Pool”,
makes such presuppositions. I argue for four claims. (1) Langton and West’s
account of how pornography silences women is empirically dubious. (2) There is
no evidence that very much pornography makes the sorts of presuppositions
they require. (3) Even “Dirty Pool”, for all its other problems, does not make
the presuppositions that Langton and West claim it does. (4) Langton and West
misread “Dirty Pool” because they do not take proper account of the fact that
pornography traffics in sexual fantasy.
Pornography, it is sometimes said, tells lies about women.1 The anti-
pornography ordinance proposed by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A.
MacKinnon (1988, p. 101) went so far as to define pornography as sex-
ually explicit media that, among other things, encodes such ‘messages’
as that women “experience sexual pleasure in being raped”.2 These
messages are then supposed to be internalized by viewers of pornogra-
phy, much to the detriment of women. As Rae Langton and Caroline
West note, however, little if any pornography makes such pronounce-
1 This now familiar phrasing is due to John Stoltenberg, whose essay “The Forbidden
Language of Sex” concludes with the words: “Pornography tells lies about women. But
pornography tells the truth about men” (Stoltenberg, 1989, p. 106).
2 Dworkin and MacKinnon famously use the term “pornography” in a ‘thick’ sense, but
I shall use it in a morally and politically neutral way: as applying, roughly, to sexually
explicit media that, in some sense, and to some significant extent, is intended to facilitate
sexual arousal in those who engage with it. That said, I’ll not be particularly careful in
what follows about when I’m talking about pornography quite generally and when I’m
talking just about what we might call “misogynistic pornography”. Context should make
that clear enough.
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ments explicitly (L&W, p. 306).3 We need to be told, therefore, just how
pornography encodes the lies it tells.
Answering this question is the central purpose of Langton and West’s
paper “Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game”. L&W, as I shall
henceforth call them, suggest that the mechanism is what philosophers
and linguists call presupposition. Someone who asks “Does Jean regret
voting for Smith?” does not explicitly say that Jean voted for Smith.
But one can only regret what one actually did, so even raising the
question whether Jean regrets voting for Smith presupposes that Jean
did in fact vote for Smith. Similarly, L&W claim, the sorts of stories
told by pornography presuppose such facts as that “. . . ‘Gang rape is
enjoyable for women’ or ‘Sexual violence is legitimate’. . . ” (L&W, p. 312).
Those stories would make no sense if one were to presume instead that
women do not enjoy being raped. Moreover, ordinary “public and private
sexual conversations” between men and women are alleged to incorporate
“the presupposition, introduced and reinforced by pornography, that a
woman’s no sometimes means yes” (L&W, p. 314). As a result, some
women’s real-world attempts to refuse sex by saying “No” fail, with the
result that these women are date-raped (Langton, 1993, pp. 320–1; L&W,
p. 314).
It is essential to this argument that (a good deal of) pornography
does presuppose, e.g., that a woman’s “No” does not always mean no.
What evidence do L&W offer for this claim? Perhaps surprisingly, they
discuss only one actual example of pornography, a somewhat infamous
pictorial, “Dirty Pool”, that was published in Hustler in January 1983.
The previously mentioned claims about gang rape and sexual violence
are specifically made only about it. But L&W (p. 311, fn. 20) insist, in
a footnote, that the story “Dirty Pool” tells is “in many ways typical”—
typical, presumably, in the respects just mentioned. The question in
which I’m interested here is whether any of these claims are true.
Here is the plan. We’ll begin by recalling some basic points about
presupposition. I’ll then argue, in section 2, that Langton’s account
of how pornography silences women rests upon empirically dubious
assumptions about acquaintance rape, though it will emerge that there
may be a different way in which pornography silences women, assuming
it presupposes what L&W say it does. As we’ll see in section 3, however,
it is doubtful that very much contemporary pornography does make such
presuppositions. Even “Dirty Pool” doesn’t, or so I’ll argue in section 4.
3 References to Langton and West (1999) are marked “L&W”.
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The overall point will turn out to be one that feminists have been making
since the dawn of the anti-pornography movement: that the sort of
flat-footed, literal reading of pornography that we find in L&W either
overlooks or misunderstands the fact that pornography traffics in sexual
fantasy (see e.g. Webster, 1981; Willis, 1983).
1 Presupposition
The notion of presupposition first appears in the work of Gottlob Frege
(1984, pp. 168ff), but it was Sir Peter Strawson who brought it to promi-
nence. As against Bertrand Russell (1905), who had argued that “The
King of France is bald” logically implies that France has a king, Straw-
son (1950) argued that the sentence instead presupposes that France
has a king—as does its negation, “The King of France is not bald”. In-
deed, if France has no king, then utterances of “The King of France is
bald” do not even express a proposition, or so Strawson claims. Thus,
a sentence’s presuppositions might reasonably be regarded as ‘felicity
conditions’ on its utterance: Generally speaking, one ought not to utter a
sentence whose presuppositions are not satisfied, since one will, in such
circumstances, not actually manage to say anything.
For Strawson, then, presupposition is a ‘logical’ relation between a
sentence and a proposition. Robert Stalnaker (1974), by contrast, argued
that the more fundamental notion is what someone presupposes. It
would be better, on his account, to say that someone who utters “The
King of France is bald” makes it manifest that they are presupposing
that France has a king. And, in so far as utterances of that sentence
have a ‘felicity condition’, it is not that France should have a king, but
rather that it should be mutually presupposed, among the parties to
whatever conversation is under way, that France has a king. These
mutual presuppositions constitute what would later come to be called
the ‘common ground’ of the conversation.4
It is important to appreciate that presuppositions, in Stalnaker’s
sense, are not necessarily beliefs, although it is not uncommon for philoso-
phers to operate with what Stalnaker (2002, p. 704) describes as a ‘simple
model’ according to which the common ground does just consist of mutual
beliefs. In general, however, presuppositions need not be believed. The
4 Stalnaker (1974, p. 49) uses this phrase in his first paper on the topic, but only
once, and not in any technical sense. I do not know how or when it became standard
terminology.
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most common counterexamples are explicit suppositions. “Suppose Alex
is a spy”, I might say. Then, assuming you are willing to play along, we
now mutually presuppose that Alex is a spy. Thus, you could now say,
“Then Sam must be a spy, too”. The word “too” is a so-called presuppo-
sition trigger: Use of that word, in this case, is felicitious only if it is
presupposed that some other conversationally relevant person is a spy.
That this utterance is now felicitous thus shows that it really is being
presupposed that Alex is a spy.
The terms usually used in this connection are “accept” and its cog-
nates (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 715). So, in the conversation just described, we
would be said to ‘accept’ that Alex is a spy. But our accepting it amounts
to different things in different cases, and this technical notion of accep-
tance must be sharply distinguished from nearby notions. Acceptance, in
this sense, is in no way a dilute form of belief. Supposition utterly lacks
the ‘truth-directed’ character of belief, and what you accept in the context
of a particular conversation can even contradict what you believe.5
This is critically important in the present context. L&W propose to
explain how pornography inculcates its misogynistic presuppositions in
its viewers in terms of what David Lewis (1979) called “accommodation”:
If one is watching a pornographic film that presupposes that women enjoy
being raped, then one has no choice but to accept that presupposition
while watching the film, since otherwise the film would make no sense.
It’s a short slide to the claim that one must believe that women enjoy
being raped in order to engage with the film; it would then be quite clear
how pornography could “alter beliefs rather directly”, all but forcing its
viewers to believe what it presupposes (Langton, 2012, p. 84). But the
only sense in which one must ‘accept’ such presuppositions is very weak:
I might equally accept, ‘for the sake of argument’, that Alex is a spy;
the presuppositions that I accept, as already said, can contradict what
I believe. To borrow a formulation from Stalnaker (2002, p. 716), the
presuppostions one accepts at a given time are what one is prepared
to take for granted for the purposes of the conversation in which one is
engaged at that time, and only for that. So it is not immediately clear
why the presupposition that women enjoy being raped, even if one is
5 Langton (2012, p. 84) later acknowledges this point, but she dismisses its significance,
writing: “. . . [B]asically, on Stalnaker’s approach the shared common ground is identified
with certain belief-like propositional attitudes of the speakers. . . ”. But, while acceptance
is like belief in certain ways—ways in which it is unlike desire or intention—it is not
like belief in the ways that matter here, which have to do with the way that beliefs affect
behavior.
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forced to ‘accept’ it while viewing a particular film, should propagate
beyond the context of viewing. But it must do so if it is to affect real
women who are not party to the pornographic ‘conversation’.
There is much more to be said about this issue, but I shall not pursue
it further here. What matters for present purposes is just that, when I
speak in what follows of viewers who ‘accept’ pornography’s misogynistic
presuppositions, it is this technical notion of acceptance that I have
in mind. I am neither claiming nor conceding, say, that someone who
engages pornographically with “Dirty Pool” must believe that women
enjoy being raped, if that is indeed what it presupposes.
2 Presupposition and Silencing
L&W (pp. 311-2) claim that “Dirty Pool” presupposes the rape myth that
a woman’s “No” sometimes means yes and that it is typical in this respect.
This claim is meant to underwrite the thesis, which Langton develops
in more detail elsewhere, that pornography silences women. Langton
writes:6
Sometimes a woman tries to use the “no” locution to refuse sex,
and it does not work. It does not work for the twenty percent
of undergraduate women who report that they have been
date raped. It does not work for the twenty-five percent of
final-year schoolgirls who report that they have been sexually
forced. Saying “no” sometimes doesn’t work, but there are two
ways in which it can fail to work. (Langton, 1993, p. 320)
The first way is that a man might recognize a woman’s intention to refuse
sex but simply ignore it.7 That, Langton says, is “simple rape”. The
case to which she wants to draw attention is a different one, in which
a woman says “No”, but her utterance does not even count as a refusal
(Langton, 1993, p. 321). That, L&W (p. 314) suggest, is what happens in
6 To be clear, I do not doubt the statistics Langton mentions. Nor am I any less
outraged by them than she is. What is at issue here is what explains the prevalence of
date rape and, relatedly, how we might best combat it. All of the researchers I shall be
citing are motivated by such concerns. See e.g. Beres (2010, p. 12).
7 I find the idea that women must ‘refuse’ sex disturbing, but that sort of language is
so common that it is hard to blame anyone in particular for it. Nonetheless, I shall avoid
it where possible. My use below of such terms as “invite” and “decline” was inspired by
Rebecca Kukla (2018).
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many cases of date rape,8 and pornography is supposed to silence women
by making it the case that, in some sexual contexts, a woman’s saying
“No” does not constitute her refusing sex.9 This is what Langton calls
‘illocutionary disablement’.
As Daniel Jacobson (1995, pp. 76ff) was perhaps the first to note,
there is a serious worry that, if so, no rape has occurred in such cases:
The woman has not actually refused her partner’s request for sex. But
that is too quick: That the woman has not refused does not imply that
she has consented (Hornsby and Langton, 1998, p. 31). As Nellie Wieland
(2007, pp. 451–5) argues, however, if a woman’s saying “No” doesn’t count
as her refusing, then that would seem to diminish the responsibility of
date rapists to some degree, which is still problematic. Ishani Maitra
and Mary Kate McGowan (2010, p. 171) reply that, even if “pornogra-
phy causes (some) viewers to make interpretive mistakes” (e.g., not to
interpret “No” as a refusal), that does not by itself show that there is
diminished responsibility: There may have been other indications, even
clear indications, of the woman’s non-consent. Surely the man ought to
have been sensitive to those.
But it is far from clear that there need be any other indications of
non-consent. What if the woman does just say “No” and does not resist
in any other way, perhaps out of concern for her physical safety? Cases
of this form are especially common when the woman initially gives her
consent but later withdraws it. If intercourse becomes uncomfortable,
physically or otherwise, and if all a women does is say “No” or “Stop”
(cf. Gattuso, 2015), then the man’s ‘finishing’ is not rape if pornography
has made it the case that she does not withdraw her consent by uttering
such words. But it is rape.10
8 It’s worth noting that date rape was something of a new idea when Langton was
writing her first paper on these topics (Langton, 1993). A book that advertised itself as
the first collection of scholarly work on date rape was published just two years before
Langton’s paper (Parrot and Bechhofer, 1991).
9 It would be difficult to overstate the extent to which it has become a sort of ‘common
knowledge’ among analytic philosophers that date rape is often a result of women’s
refusals not being recognized as such. Jennifer Hornsby (1995) and Mary Kate McGowan
(2003) develop explanations of this ‘fact’ that are closely related to Langton’s; Miranda
Fricker (2007, pp. 137–42) and Rosa Vince (2018) offer explanations of the same ‘fact’
that are broadly epistemological. I have heard the claim made by many others, too, often
in passing, as if it is just something we all know.
10 Rape is a legal category, and I am not a lawyer. So the claim, to put it more carefully,
is that such an act constitutes an extremely serious form of sexual misconduct for which
the man is blameworthy. But that cannot be if the woman has not withdrawn her
consent.
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Langton also makes questionable empirical assumptions. As she sees
it, (heterosexual) date rape is often the result of a failure of ‘uptake’: a
failure by some man to recognize what illocutionary act (refusal) some
woman is trying to perform (Hornsby and Langton, 1998, pp. 27–8). Lang-
ton thus accepts a form of the so-called miscommunication hypothesis,
which was quite popular when she was writing her first papers on porno-
graphy.11 But that hypothesis was quickly challenged by feminists who
worried that it blames women for their own rapes (see e.g. McCaw and
Senn, 1998, esp. pp. 610, 622–3), and the initial evidence that seemed to
support it was soon contradicted. Now, after more than three decades
of empirical work, I think it is safe to say that the miscommunication
hypothesis has been thoroughly refuted, as much of a hold as it may still
have on what passes for common wisdom.
Celia Kitzinger and Hannah Frith showed over two decades ago
that women typically decline sexual invitations using the very same
conversational strategies that they (and other people) use to decline
other sorts of invitations. People just do not normally decline invitations
by directly saying “No”:
. . . [Y]oung women find it difficult to say ‘no’ to sex at least
partly because saying immediate clear and direct ‘no’s (to any-
thing) is not a normal conversational activity. Young women
who do not use the word ‘no’, but who refuse sex with delays,
prefaces, palliatives and accounts are using conversational
patterns which are normatively recognized as refusals in ev-
eryday life. (Kitzinger and Frith, 1999, p. 310)
One might think that women who refuse indirectly invite misunderstand-
ing, but, in oft-quoted remarks, Kitzinger and Frith draw a very different
conclusion:
If there is an organized and normative way of doing indirect
refusal, . . . then men who claim not to have understood an
indirect refusal (as in, ‘she didn’t actually say no’) are claim-
ing to be cultural dopes, and playing rather disingenuously
11 The miscommunication hypothesis seems to have originated in such works as You
Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation, by the sociolinguist Deborah
Tannen (1991). A related though earlier view is that date rape is sometimes due to men’s
misperception of women’s level of sexual interest (see e.g. Abbey, 1991). These views
can be combined, and often were. See Frith and Kitzinger (1997, pp. 517–22) and Gavey
(2005, ch. 2) for the history.
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on how refusals are usually done and understood to be done.
They are claiming not to understand perfectly normal conver-
sational interaction, and to be ignorant of ways of expressing
refusal which they themselves routinely use in other areas of
their lives. (Kitzinger and Frith, 1999, p. 310)
Kitzinger and Frith’s position is almost opposite Langton’s: Things other
than “No” often do mean no and are readily understood as doing so. But
Kitzinger and Frith do not quite contradict Langton. Her view is that,
in a sexual context, men’s ability to recognize ordinary refusals fails,
because pornography has made it the case that, in those contexts, what
would ordinarily count as a refusal does not there count as one.
But follow-up studies have shown that men are perfectly capable of
understanding even subtle non-verbal ways in which women express a
lack of interest in sex (O’Byrne et al., 2006, 2008). As Melanie Beres
puts it in describing the results of one of her studies:
. . . [W]omen and men’s demonstrated literacy in social re-
fusals generally should also apply to accepting or refusing
sexual invitations. Not only were men and women able to
identify verbal forms of disinterest or refusal, but they also de-
scribed subtle forms of non-verbal refusals. These non-verbal
signals were considered to be obvious and easy to interpret.
These men and women articulated these cues in the context
of casual sex; they did not know their partners well enough to
read their unique body language. (Beres, 2010, p. 11, empha-
sis added)
There is simply no evidence that the difference between sexual and non-
sexual contexts has the significance that Langton needs it to have, even
where non-verbal communication is concerned.
There is other research that bears upon this issue, as well. Work
done in the 1980s seemed at first to show that women do frequently offer
‘token resistance’ to sex so as not to seem too ‘easy’ (e.g. Muehlenhard
and Hollabaugh, 1988),12 but later work essentially refuted this claim
(e.g. Muehlenhard and Rodgers, 1998).13 Interestingly, however, the
12 Vince (2018, pp. 3–5) discusses some of this early work but seems unaware of what
followed.
13 Methodological issues with the earlier studies are discussed in detail in the paper
just referenced and work cited therein, as well as the other papers to be mentioned
below. Note that one of the authors of the later study just cited is the same as one of the
authors of the earlier study: Muehlenhard refuted her own earlier work.
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reason is not that women never say “No” when they actually do have
some interest in sex. The reason is that what women mean by “No” is
more nuanced than one might have imagined—though what they mean
is, again, readily understood in practice.
In one study, for example, Melanie Beres, Charlene Y. Senn, and
Jodee McCaw (2014, p. 768) asked subjects who had some experience
with heterosexual relationships to imagine themselves having had a very
pleasant date, including “a really enjoyable dinner”, after which they
went back to the woman’s home to continue the “terrific” conversation.14
They are “both feeling close”, and the man “makes a sexual advance”.
The woman refuses—the study does use the word “refuse”—but they
later engage in sex anyway, including intercourse. The question that
Beres, Senn, and McCaw asked their subjects was: What happened in
between? Subjects were asked to imagine what their own experience
might have been and then to answer the question free-form, at whatever
length they wished. (This methodology is known as ‘story completion’.)
Nearly 80% of the subjects—and about the same percentage of men
and women—wrote stories that reflected an initial ambivalence on the
woman’s part (as opposed to a definite aversion to sex with this new
partner), an ambivalence later resolved in favor of sex with him (Beres
et al., 2014, p. 769). Crucially for our purposes, none of these 80%, either
men or women, thought that the woman’s initial “No” did not mean no.
Rather, they recognized that a woman’s not wanting to have sex now
does not preclude her wanting to have sex later:
In the ambivalence stories, the male characters recognized
the possibility of ambivalence and either left it up to the
female character to initiate any further sexual activity, or
they addressed the source of the ambivalence by engaging in
conversation with the female character.15 (Beres et al., 2014,
p. 773)
Stories that involved some sort of coercion were much less common, but,
even then, the man recognized the woman’s refusal as such. He just
chose to ignore it. Even in the stories in which the woman fully intended
14 It’s her home in the version of the story given to women. It’s not said whose home it
is in the men’s version. (See also McCaw and Senn (1998), which uses much the same
story.)
15 Note that this does not mean harrassing or haranguing the female character until
she gives in. See note 17.
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to engage in sex when she first declined, what her “No” usually meant
was not now or not yet:
. . . [T]he refusal is directed toward the specific timing of the
behavior refused. The refusal is very situational and reflects
that the woman is changing things to fit her idea of how she
would like the evening and the sex to progress. (Beres et al.,
2014, p. 772)
Only 4 of the 252 stories collected—that is, 1.6% of them—featured a
token “No” that clearly did not mean no (Beres et al., 2014, pp. 772–
3). The authors conclude that “. . . there is little evidence to support the
miscommunication hypothesis, despite its widespread acceptance” (Beres
et al., 2014, p. 774).
But the really crucial point here is that what “No” means in such a
context is typically “I do not consent to sex”. It does not necessarily mean
“I do not want to have sex”.16 One can want to have sex but not consent
to it, and one can consent to sex one does not want to have. Having
sex with someone who wants to do so but does not consent is rape, but
having sex with someone who consents but does not want to have sex is
more complicated, and its ethical status (as opposed to its legal status)
would seem to depend upon the person’s reasons for consenting. In an
established relationship, one might consent to sex as an act of generosity,
even when one is not ‘in the mood’. For our purposes, what’s most
important is that the participants in the study we have been discussing
seem quite capable of tracking this difference: In the ambivalence stories,
in particular, the male character clearly recognizes that the female
character does not consent to sex while simultaneously recognizing that
she might be ambivalent about wanting it.17 The subtlety and complexity
of this response is what is most strikingly inconsistent, it seems to me,
with the miscommunication hypothesis.
Presumably, there must be some cases in which refusals aren’t rec-
ognized as such, but there is scant evidence that this is a significant
factor in date rape. As Kitzinger and Frith (1999, p. 310) put it, “. . . the
16 For a summary of early work on this distinction, see Muehlenhard and Peterson
(2005), which suggests that a failure to distinguish consenting from wanting vitiates the
early studies on token resistance.
17 There are complex issues here about when it is permissible to try to interest someone
in sex when they have already declined, and when doing so starts to become coercive.
Such themes surface in some of the coercion stories that Beres et al. received. But that
does not suggest, let alone imply, that men have difficulty recognizing refusals.
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root of the problem is not that [some] men do not understand sexual
refusals, but that they do not like them”. That is, women are date-raped
not because “[r]efusal. . . has become unspeakable” (Langton, 1993, p.
321) but because their refusals, though recognized as such, are ignored.
Contrary to what Langton suggests, that is to say, date rape typically
just is ‘simple’ rape.18 If so, however, then pornography does not silence
women in the way that Langton claims it does, simply because women
aren’t silenced in that way.
Pornography might silence women in a different way, however. The
miscommunication hypothesis clearly has some cultural currency. So,
even if it is uncommon for men actually to misunderstand women’s
refusals, date-rapists might still be able to exploit people’s false belief
that such misunderstandings are common to excuse their own behavior.
Indeed, there is evidence that some men do just that (O’Byrne et al.,
2008). There is even evidence that some women appeal to this same
myth to avoid blaming men they know and like for hurting them (Frith
and Kitzinger, 1997, p. 524). None of that is ‘illocutionary disablement’
in Langton’s sense, so far as I can see. Still, if people’s readiness to
believe that ‘consent is complicated’ makes it difficult for women who
are date-raped to convince other people (friends or jurors) that they were
raped, then perhaps that would count as illocutionary disablement (cf.
Langton, 1993, p. 326; Vince, 2018, pp. 5–6).
Arguably, then, the miscommunication hypothesis is a rape myth. So,
if pornography helps to propagate it, then that is a problem.
3 Pornography and Rape Myths
The question remains, however, just how pornography might encourage
the false belief that women do not clearly communicate their sexual
consent or refusal. That, of course, is the main question that L&W mean
to be answering, so the core of their analysis is untouched by what was
argued in the last section. If pornography presupposes that women often
say “No” when they do not (in any sense) mean No, then that might well
18 There is additional, though controversial, evidence for this claim. Some research has
suggested that most date rapes are committed by repeat offenders who know exactly what
they are doing: men who target women that they identify as vulnerable, incapacitate
them with alcohol (by far the most common date rape drug), and purposely isolate them
before assaulting them (Lisak and Miller, 2002; Lisak, 2011). As said, however, that
research is controversial, in part because one of the authors, David Lisak, is himself
somewhat controversial.
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lead people to believe that it is easy for men to be misled. The rape myth
would still be encouraged by pornography, then, even if the effect of the
myth’s acceptance was somewhat different from what Langton suggests.
If pornography is to enforce this sort of myth, however, then porno-
graphy that makes such presuppositions needs to be relatively common.
If only rarely viewed pornography made such presuppositions, then it
would be hard to see how it could contribute very much to the cultural
ubiquity of such myths. That, I take it, is why L&W (p. 311, fn. 20) insist,
as was noted earlier, that the story that “Dirty Pool” tells is “in many
ways typical”. What they mean, presumably, is that “Dirty Pool” is typical
in how it bears upon the issue of silencing and so in what it presupposes,
namely, that a woman’s saying “No” does not always indicate that she
does not consent to sex. Indeed, the way that Langton talks about porno-
graphy elsewhere strongly suggests that, like many anti-pornography
feminists, she believes that it often features non-consensual sex (see e.g.
Langton, 1993, pp. 307–8). But does it?
There are some pornographic films that, at least arguably, fit this
sort of description. One example is Behind the Green Door, which was
directed by the Mitchell Brothers and released in 1972. Gloria (played by
Marilyn Chambers) is taken against her will to a sort of sex club. A mime
warms up the crowd while Gloria is prepared by six female attendants
for what is to happen to her. As the women lead her onto the stage, an
announcement is made:19
Ladies and gentlemen, you are about to witness the ravish-
ment of a woman who has been abducted. A woman whose
initial fear and anxiety has mellowed into curious expectation.
Although at first her reactions may lead you to believe that
she is being tortured, quite the contrary is true. For no harm
will come to those being ravished. In the morning, she will
be set free, unaware of anything except that she has been
loved as never before. . . . So, with the knowledge that you
are powerless to stop the performance, just relax and enjoy
yourself to the fullest extent.
In fact, Gloria is still frightened and anxious when her ‘ravishment’
begins, but she is soon overcome by her own arousal and before long
seems to be participating willingly, even enthusiastically.
19 My attention was drawn to Green Door by Linda Williams’s discussion of it, to be
mentioned shortly. Williams does not get the announcement quite right. I had to listen
to it several times, and I’m still not sure I’ve got it right.
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It is not exactly shocking, then, that Linda Williams should conclude,
in her ground-breaking study of pornography as film, that Green Door
is “regressive and misogynist” (Williams, 1989, p. 157).20 But Williams
situates that observation in a complex analysis of Green Door and its
place in the development of hardcore cinematic pornography. Williams
(1989, p. 164) ultimately concludes that Green Door’s “celebration of rav-
ishment” is a feature of its ‘separated utopianism’, which she regards as a
particularly escapist aspect of some pornography of this era.21 Moreover,
Williams emphasizes not just how diverse pornography already was in
1972—the very different films Deep Throat and The Devil in Miss Jones
were released the same year, both directed by Gerard Damiano—but also
how significantly pornography changed over the next decade or so.
Nothing illustrates those changes better than the (truly awful) sequel
to Green Door, which was released in 1986 and which revisits many of
the themes of the original, though those themes are significantly trans-
formed. Williams (1989, p. 239) remarks that “. . . the revisions of the
original film’s narrative quite explicitly aim at modifying its misogyny,
at making it more acceptable to women and thus to viewing couples”.
Williams is here alluding to an important consequence of the domes-
tication of pornography in the intervening years. The emergence of
technologies that allowed people to watch pornography at home helped
to make possible the ‘couples market’, since women were far more re-
luctant than men to enter the seedy theaters and ‘arcades’ to which
pornography was consigned after the early 1970s (Williams, 1989, pp.
171–2; see also Juffer, 1998).22 This new market encouraged a signifi-
cant softening of pornography through the 1980s. I know of no evidence
that very many films from that era—i.e., from when Langton and her
collaborators were writing—featured any sort of non-consensual sex.
Nor is there any convincing evidence that much contemporary por-
nography features non-consensual sex. In an effort to document the
allegedly ‘violent’ character of mainstream pornography, Ana J. Bridges
20 Darren Kerr (2012) has argued for a more progressive reading of Green Door. He
may well have a point, but I’ll not interrogate Williams’s reading here.
21 As Williams (1989, pp. 156–66) reads the film, the green door represents a portal to
a wonderland beyond the dreary lives of the truckers whose memories the film recounts.
It’s the way that sexual bliss is presented as the solution to the problems of ordinary life
that marks the film as separated uptopian. (Following Richard Dyer (1981), Williams
compares the film at some length to certain forms of musical, especially ones from the
Great Depression.)
22 The original such technology was the the video cassette recorder, or VCR. These
would later be replaced by DVD players and, later still, by the internet.
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and her colleagues examined 304 scenes from the top-selling videos of
2005. Their oft-cited conclusion was that 88% of these scenes included
some form of physical aggression (Bridges et al., 2010, p. 1079). Their
definition of ‘aggression’ has proven controversial (see e.g. Weitzer, 2015),
and other studies have reached quite different conclusions (e.g. Tibbals,
2010). For our purposes, however, what’s most important is that, despite
their focus on sexual violence,23 Bridges et al. (2010, p. 1080) explic-
itly note that they “did not observe depictions of rape or scenes that
perpetuated the ‘rape myth’. . . ”. Not even one.24
About a decade later, Marleen Klaassen and Jochen Peter studied
the one hundred most-viewed videos from each of four popular internet
sites and found that only 6% of them portrayed non-consensual sex in
which women were the victims—the same percentage as portrayed non-
consensual sex in which men were the victims (Klaassen and Peter, 2015,
p. 728). Klaassen and Peter do not tell us whether any of these involved
a woman’s saying “No” but not thereby refusing sex. But even if we
assume that all of them did, such scenarios would still be exceptional.
Klaassen and Peter (2015, p. 731) conclude that their results “contradict
the notion that women who are forced into sex are a central component
of [contemporary] pornography. . . ”.
What the empirical literature suggests, then, is that not much popu-
lar pornography makes the sorts of presuppositions that L&W claim it
does, and it hasn’t for a long time. There is surely some that does, but it
seems unlikely that there is enough of it for pornography to make any
especially significant contribution to the propogation of rape myths.
4 What Does “Dirty Pool” Presuppose?
I turn now to “Dirty Pool” itself. I am going to argue that even it does not
presuppose rape myths. Whether it does is not, in itself, a particularly
interesting question. But the claims that L&W make about “Dirty Pool”,
23 I emphasize this point because pornography researchers almost always seem to
have an agenda. In so far as Bridges et al. have an agenda, it is certainly not that of
‘defenders’ of pornography.
24 They additionally remark: “This finding mirrors findings in the literature on por-
nography effects: recent studies have failed to uncover a previously robust finding
that aggressive pornography increases acceptance of rape and endorsement of the rape
myth” (Bridges et al., 2010, p. 1080, my emphasis). (This ‘robust finding’ was always
controversial and was at best correlational (Weitzer, 2015).)
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and the grounds on which they do so, are worth considering, since the
mistakes they make are common enough to be instructive.
Before we begin, let me emphasize that I will not be arguing that
“Dirty Pool” isn’t misogynistic. There are plenty of ways in which it is.
What I am claiming is just that “Dirty Pool” does not make the sorts
of presuppositions that L&W claim it does: that women enjoy being
gang-raped, etc. Let me also warn the reader that some of what follows
may seem pedantic. But the claim we are considering is that certain
sorts of misogynistic “presuppositions are required in order to make sense
of what is explicitly said and illustrated. . . ” in this particular pictorial
(L&W, p. 311, my emphasis).25 That is a very strong claim, and we will
need to consider several weakenings of it.
The claims that L&W make about “Dirty Pool” are central to their
argument: This pictorial is, as I’ve said, the only concrete example of
pornography they mention; they regard it as typical and extrapolate
from it. One might have expected, then, that they would have examined
it carefully. It seems, however, that they might not have seen it. They
describe the associated text as “captions to the series of sexually graphic
pictures” (L&W, p. 311). But, while there are six double pages of pic-
tures, there is only a single block of text on one page; it is certainly not
something I’d describe as “captions to the series of. . . pictures”, or even ‘a
caption’. Moreover, L&W misquote the text, omitting the final ten words
of the last sentence (which, as we shall see, are actually quite important).
L&W seem to be relying here upon a paper by Catherine Itzin that they
cite in this connection: Itzin (1992, p. 30) also omits the last ten words
(though she does at least replace them with elipses). Moreover, some
of L&W’s claims about what “Dirty Pool” presupposes—e.g., “that the
female waitress says ‘no’ when she really means ‘yes’; . . . that raping a
woman is sexy and erotic for man and woman alike” (L&W, p. 311)—
seem to be borrowed from Itzin’s paper, which includes the words: “The
message is that while [the woman] says ‘no’ at first, she really means ‘yes’
for once the men touch her, she immediately gives way to the ‘ecstasy’ of
gang-rape”.26
25 L&W add a caveat: that these presuppositions may only be “required for one way,
perhaps the most natural and obvious way of making sense of” the pictorial (L&W, pp.
311–2). But the readings I’ll be discussing will not be outlandish. One of them is even
correct.
26 I should emphasize that I am not accusing L&W of plagarism. But their citations are
sloppy: It is utterly unclear to me whether they regard their characterization of “Dirty
Pool” as simply a repetition of Itzin’s or as their own. And Itzin’s own characterization,
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Should we trust Itzin’s characterization? Actually, it is not her own.
She credits it to a slideshow presentation developed by a group then
known as ‘Organizing Against Pornography’.27 According to the Min-
nesota Historical Society (2019), this organization, which was founded
in 1984 as the Pornography Resource Center, “was actively involved in
the passage by the Minneapolis City Council of an anti-pornography
ordinance, which had been prepared by Catharine MacKinnon in 1983”.
This is the same organization that published Dworkin and MacKinnon’s
manifesto Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women’s Equal-
ity (1988). Organizing Against Pornography was thus not an academic
collective, and its claims should not be cited as if it were.28
Perhaps, then, it is worth our taking a look at “Dirty Pool” ourselves.29
The pictorial comprises nine photographs over, as I have said, six double
pages. It features one woman, a waitress in what appears to be a working-
class bar, and four leather-clad men gathered around a pool table.30 At
the lower right on the fifth page are five sentences of text:
Watching the muscular men at play is too much for the ex-
citable young waitress. Though she pretends to ignore them,
these men know when they see an easy lay. She is thrown on
the felt table, and one manly hand after another probes her
most private areas. Completely vulnerable, she feels one after
another enter her fiercely. As the three violators explode in a
shower of climaxes, she comes in a shuddering orgasm of her
own and quickly passes out from the ordeal.
as we are about to see, is itself borrowed, which threatens to make L&W’s account
third-hand.
27 Eithne Johnson (1997) discusses the theatrics of these sorts of presentations.
28 Many of the “detailed descriptions of the kinds of pornography widely available in
the United States and the United Kingdom” that L&W (p. 311, fn. 20) find in Itzin’s
paper are extracted from this same presentation. L&W do note that Itzin “draw[s] on
work done by Jeanne Barkey and J. Koplin”, but they do not note that Itzin is, for the
most part, just quoting the slideshow, and they do not note that Barkey and Koplin were
activists, not researchers with even a token commitment to objectivity.
29 As of this writing, the pictorial is readily available online for those interested in
studying it. A relatively obvious web search should suffice.
30 One of the four men is never shown undressed, although he seems in many ways
like the ring-leader. All of the characters, it also seems worth noting, are so stylized as
to be almost cartoonish.
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Now what does this story presuppose? We can start by considering L&W’s
suggestion that it presupposes that gang rape is enjoyable for women.31
All women? There does not seem to be anything about the pictorial that
suggests that the waitress is meant to represent women in general.32
Granted, not much is said about who this woman is, other than that she
is a “young waitress” and an “easy lay”. But it is just not true that one
cannot “make sense of what is explicitly said and illustrated. . . ” in the
pictorial (L&W, p. 311) without accepting that, quite generally, women
enjoy being raped. At most, the pictorial seems to presuppose that rape
can be enjoyable for women, or that it is enjoyable for some women, such
as the waitress (an ‘easy lay’). But that would be bad enough.
What is meant here by enjoyment? A clue is provided by L&W’s
suggestion that “Dirty Pool” presupposes “that raping a woman is sexy
and erotic for man and woman alike” (L&W, p. 311). What L&W seem to
be claiming, to borrow language from Dworkin and MacKinnon (1988, p.
101), would thus seem to be that “Dirty Pool” presupposes that (some)
women “experience sexual pleasure in being raped”. And indeed, not
only does the accompanying text describe the waitress as having a “shud-
dering orgasm”, but some of the later photographs seem to portray her,
through her facial expressions, as sexually aroused.33 So, again, the
suggestion might be that what the pictorial presupposes is that women
sometimes experience sexual pleasure while being raped.
But, as uncomfortable as this fact might be, that is just true. A
significant percentage of people who are subjected to non-consensual
sexual stimulation do experience sexual arousal and even orgasm. In
one study, for example, 21% of female victims reported having a “physical
response” during a sexual assault, even though, in almost all of those
cases, violence was used to coerce the victim (Levin and van Berlo, 2004,
p. 86).34 Even orgasm during rape is not uncommon, a fact that seems to
31 There are also questions to be raised about the alleged presupposition that raping a
woman is enjoyable for men, but I shall leave it to the reader to consider what questions
those might be.
32 I do not doubt that female nudes, e.g., can be representative of women in general (cf.
Eaton, 2012). But we need to be told why that should be true in this case, if it is, and I
do not see any reason to think that it is.
33 As Cindy Patton (1989, p. 105) notes, this is the same stereotypical, and limited,
visual language that is often used to represent women’s sexual pleasure, whether in
pornography or in advertising.
34 The study in question was originally published in Dutch (and was conducted by
different authors). I am therefore relying upon the report of its results in the paper cited
(one of whose authors, van Berlo, was also an author of that paper).
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be well-known to clinicians and rape crisis workers (see e.g. Atkinson,
2008, pp. 185–8). In response to an inquiry about this heart-breaking
phenomenon, one therapist wrote:
Approximately 1 in 20 women who come to the clinic. . . for
treatment because of sexual abuse report that they have had
an orgasm from previous unsolicited sexual arousal. It is not
detailed in the (professional) literature because the victims
usually do not want to tell/talk about it because they feel
guilty, as people will think that if it happened they must have
enjoyed it. The victims often say, “My body let me down”.
Some however, cannot summon the courage to say even that.
(Levin and van Berlo, 2004, p. 85)
Presumably, however, Hustler is not primarily in the business of con-
veying such factual information as that women sometimes experience
orgasm during rape. There is supposed to be something significant about
the waitress’s orgasm, and the obvious proposal is that what’s being
suggested in “Dirty Pool” is that the sexual pleasure experienced by the
‘young waitress’ excuses the violence perpetrated against her. What her
orgasm is supposed to reveal, that is to say, is that what originally looked
like violence was really just seduction.
Such a myth is sadly familiar (cf. Littleton and Axsom, 2003). Even
victims are vulnerable to its effects, a fact that can make experienc-
ing sexual arousal (let alone orgasm) during rape especially traumatic,
since it can make victims wonder whether they ‘really wanted it’ and so
whether it was rape at all (Levin and van Berlo, 2004, p. 85). But arousal
does not imply consent (and none of the authors cited mean to suggest
that it does). Perhaps, though, Hustler disagrees. Maybe that, then, is
what L&W (p. 311) mean when they suggest that “Dirty Pool” presup-
poses that the waitress “wanted to be raped and dominated all along”:
What the waitress really wanted was an orgasm (though she might not
have realized it), and what might initially have seemed liked coercion
and violence are excused by the sexual pleasure the waitress eventu-
ally experiences. To put it differently, the suggestion is that there is a
slide from “She experienced sexual pleasure” to “She enjoyed it” to “She
wanted it” to “She consented”. Every one of these steps is objectionable,
but maybe Hustler disagrees.
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If that were the right reading of “Dirty Pool”, then L&W’s remarks
about it might well be defensible. But this reading is at odds with the
text that accompanies the pictorial. The last sentence, recall, reads:35
As the three violators explode in a shower of climaxes, [the
waitress] comes in a shuddering orgasm of her own and
quickly passes out from the ordeal. (emphasis added)
That is not a description that invites the conclusion that it wasn’t really
rape because the waitress enjoyed herself. Is the presupposition, then,
that the waitress really did want to be raped?
There is a de re–de dicto ambiguity in L&W’s formulations of what
“Dirty Pool” presupposes:36 Is it, e.g., that women sometimes enjoy what
they themselves experience as rape? Or is it that women sometimes enjoy
what the pictorial does not present as rape (or as having been experienced
as rape) but which really is rape (and would be so experienced)? Probably
what L&W mean is the latter. One central function of rape myths, after
all, is to excuse certain acts that actually are rape by making them
seem as if they might have been ‘just sex’.37 But even a cursory look
at “Dirty Pool” makes it clear that it really is presenting the event in
question as a rape, and as having been experienced as such by the
waitress. All of the photographs imply some level of aggression, with
the possible exception of the last.38 Some of the photographs (especially
the second) clearly convey the waitress’s fear. And yet, some of the very
same photographs also present the waitress as sexually aroused. So
does “Dirty Pool” actually presuppose that (some) women enjoy what
they themselves experience as rape? Even while they are terrified?
35 Note now the importance of the last ten words (beginning with “of”), but especially
the last seven (beginning with “and”). Why were they omitted from the slideshow—or
from Itzin’s report of it, if the slidehow included them? (Here again, it is not clear whose
elipses elide the relevant words.)
36 And, I should emphasize, in similar formulations of what pornography in general
presupposes. So it is worth getting clear about this matter quite independently of any
concern with L&W’s claims.
37 Nicola Gavey (2005, ch. 6) raises some difficult questions about whether women
who do not characterize their own experiences as rape might nonetheless have been
raped. But I think we can set those questions aside here. It would only make things
more difficult for L&W if we denied that there could be ‘unrecognized rapes’, as they are
sometimes called.
38 It turns out, then, to be important actually to look at the pictorial—unsurprisingly,
since it is the pictures that make it pornographic, not the associated text, which is pretty
sedate. (Compare women’s descriptions of their own rape fantasies, as reported by Nancy
Friday (1973, pp. 116–22). They are far more graphic.)
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One might well want to suggest at this point that trying to make
coherent sense of the story told by “Dirty Pool” is hopeless. I submit
instead, however, that we have been trying to make sense of it the wrong
way. In particular, we have been taking the story far too literally (cf.
Butler, 1990; Segal, 1998). To see what the alternative might be, note
that, although there are no circumstances in which a woman might actu-
ally want to be raped,39 there are circumstances in which some women
want to be ‘raped’. What I have in mind is a form of consensual BDSM40
that involves roleplaying situations in which one or another partner is
raped. People sometimes go to great lengths to make these ‘scenes’ seem
as real as possible from within, because the sense of danger (or fear) is
for them a powerful erotogen (as is the trust required to engage in such
an activity with someone).41 But no one is really raped on such occasions
any more than people are really arrested when children play cops and
robbers. Not only is the entire episode both consensual and wanted,
but such ‘scenes’ are co-operative undertakings that require “a sense of
intense identification and attunement with [one’s] partner’s experience
during play” (Weille, 2002, p. 139). Moreover, the ‘victim’ is the one who
is ultimately in control: They can bring the entire episode to a halt at
any time by using their ‘safeword’ (or some similar mechanism).42
What, then, if we thought of “Dirty Pool” as documenting a consensual
BDSM ‘scene’? The pictorial itself would not have to change in any way.
But the way we read it would. Its primary perspective would be from
within the ‘scene’, and the pictorial would invite us into a world in which
a ‘waitress’ was being ‘raped’ by three ‘violators’. But, at the same time,
we would know that, back in the real world, what was happening was
39 Barring very weird philosophical thought experiments, perhaps.
40 The acronym is a melange of “Bondage, Discipline, Domination, Submission, Sadism,
Masochism”. BDSM is a form of consensual power exchange, typically but not always in
a sexual context (Cross and Matheson, 2006).
41 For a fictional account of such an experience, see Brooks (2006). The theme of
‘non-consent’ is extremely common in erotic fiction, including that written by women.
See Paasonen (2007) for discussion of such stories on the popular website Literotica.
42 There is an ‘advanced’ form of BDSM, known as ‘consensual non-consent’, that is
an exception. Kukla (2018, §VI) seems to misunderstand this term, construing it as
applicable to any roleplay in which the typical meaning of “No” and similar locutions are
suspended within certain limits. To the contrary, in consensual non-consent, consent is
only granted initially, with the understanding that it is non-revocable for the duration
of the scene. But that is not typical. It is, in fact, controversial even within the BDSM
community (Califia, 2001, pp. 198–200), and it is very risky. (For a vivid account of such
an experience—a consensual non-consensual rape—see @iSlut_ (2010). Be forewarned
that this recollection will be disturbing to many people.)
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both consensual and wanted. More importantly, for our purposes, the
pictorial so read would have none of the presuppositions that L&W claim
to find in it. In particular, there would be no suggestion that women who
were really raped might enjoy the experience. The pictorial might still
presuppose (or even say explicitly) that consensual roleplay in which
someone is ‘raped’ can be satisfying for both the ‘rapist’ and the ‘victim’.
But that’s just true. It’s why people do it.
There is, of course, a long history of feminist opposition to BDSM, dat-
ing at least to the publication of the collection Against Sadomasochism:
A Radical Feminist Analysis (Linden et al., 1982).43 Various objections
have been offered. One is that it is wrong to make one’s pleasure con-
tingent upon the existence of injustice (Vadas, 1995). Another is that
it is wrong to take pleasure in a fantasy of something that is morally
wrong (cf. Corvino, 2002). Neither claim seems terribly compelling (see
Card, 2002; Stear, 2009), but the debate continues (see Smuts, 2016).
Fortunately, though, we can set these issues aside here. Our question
is whether “Dirty Pool” presupposes that women sometimes enjoy being
raped, and no-one, so far as I am aware, has wanted to argue that role-
played rape scenes presuppose that actual women might enjoy actually
being raped. Within the scene, the woman does not want to be raped;
outside it, she only wants to be ‘raped’; nowhere does she want to be
raped. The way in which participating in BDSM involves simultaneously
occupying both of these points of view makes it difficult to understand, no
doubt, but it is also part of what makes it powerful for its practitioners
(Weille, 2002; Weiss, 2011).
All that said, I do not actually want to suggest that we should read
“Dirty Pool” as presenting a BDSM scene. What I want to suggest, rather,
is that we should think of “Dirty Pool” as a textual-cum-photographic
presentation of a sexual fantasy. One might think that L&W make this
point themselves, writing: “Pornography usually purports to be fantasy,
or fiction” (L&W, p. 314, emphasis original). But that is just a conflation.
Fantasy is usually fictional, but it is not just fictional. Fantasy, as the
term is typically used in discussions of sexuality, plays by different
43 Susan Wright (2006) reviews this literature. It’s arguable, too, that much of the
concern expressed by early anti-pornography feminists about ‘violent’ pornography was
actually concern about BDSM pornography. (It may well be that much of the pornography
that allegedly portrays non-consensual sex is also BDMS porn.) Joshua Cohen (1996, p.
286) makes a version of this point. It’s also central to many of Gayle Rubin’s discussions
of anti-pornography feminism (see e.g. Rubin, 1984, 1993).
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rules than ordinary fiction does.44 A fictional story in which a man had
intercourse with a woman while simultaneously performing oral sex
on her could only be regarded as absurd. But physical impossibility is
nothing to fantasy, part of whose charm is how it allows us to overcome
such limitations, even if only in imagination (cf. Segal, 1998, pp. 57–8).
Consider a very simple (and very common) sort of fantasy. You see
someone on the street one day with their partner and children, someone
that you find disarmingly attractive, and later that evening you mas-
turbate while imagining having sex with them.45 There are a number
of interesting questions that we might ask about your fantasy. Why do
you imagine doing what you do with them? Is there something about
the fantasy that reveals the nature of your attraction to this person?
There are a number of other questions, however, that it would be utterly
inappropriate to ask, such as: What was it that led this person to want
to cheat?46 Did they feel guilty the next day? Did they tell their partner?
And what about you, you home-wrecker?
The point is not just that the story may not have filled in enough
details for these questions to have answers. That sort of thing happens
all the time with fiction. But, when one reads fiction, one still imagines
that such questions have answers. Even if the story ends with the
clandestine lovers parting, and even if we do not know (and maybe even
cannot know) what happened the next day, something did, and the whole
point of the story may be to invite the question what that was.47 That is:
The story we are being told does at least happen within a larger world.
Fantasies, by contrast, are their own worlds. Even if the cheating is part
of the thrill, there need be no reason for it, and there need be no next
day (cf. Laplanche and Pontalis, 1968).
44 Sexual fantasy, as I’m understanding it, need not be fantasy in the psychoanalytic
sense of that term, either, though it certainly can be construed that way, at least in some
cases (Butler, 1990).
45 I assume here that there is nothing wrong with enjoying sexual fantasies, a privilege
that seems once to have been denied to women (Friday, 1973, esp. ch. 1). That said,
Julia Penelope (1980, p. 103) once went so far as to speculate that fantasizing during
masturbation may be “a phallocentric ‘need’ from which we [women] are not yet free. . . ”.
Rubin (1984, pp. 300–9) discusses this trend at some length.
46 Assuming that is what they would be doing, i.e., that they are not in an open or
polyamorous relationship.
47 Sofia Coppola’s movie Lost in Translation does precisely that, to great effect. As
the not-quite-lovers say goodbye, Bob (played by Bill Murray) whispers something to
Charlotte (played by Scarlett Johannsson), but we do not hear it. There has been much
discussion (to say the least) about what it might have been.
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Something similar is true of sexual roleplay—unsurprisingly, since
such roleplaying is often described as ‘acting out a fantasy’. Thus, if two
people roleplay a rape, then the question how the ‘victim’ dealt with the
subsequent trauma “simply doesn’t arise”, to borrow a suggestive phrase
from Strawson (1950, p. 330).48 The same goes for sexual fantasies and
so, in particular, for the fantasy presented in “Dirty Pool”. That fantasy
does not presuppose, any more than the corresponding BDSM scene
would, that real women really do enjoy really being raped.
5 Concluding Caveats
Let me be clear about what I have and have not been arguing.
I am not arguing here that there is nothing wrong with rape fantasies,
let alone that there there is nothing wrong with portraying them in a
public form: textually, photographically, or cinematically. That is a
question for another day. Our question here is whether pornography that
dramatizes such fantasies presupposes that women actually enjoy being
raped. What I have argued is that it need not and, moreover, that a close
reading of “Dirty Pool” shows that even it does not.
Nor am I claiming that “Dirty Pool” is not sexist. What I am claiming
is that the fact that “Dirty Pool” presents a rape fantasy does not by
itself make it sexist. But there is more to “Dirty Pool” than that. Though
L&W hardly mention the photographs that comprise it, “Dirty Pool” is
a pictorial.49 I would argue that what is sexist about “Dirty Pool” lies
very much in the photography, in how the pictorial visually presents the
fantasy it does. Something similar is true, or so I would argue, of much
visual pornography: What is sexist about it lies, very often, and to a
significant extent, in how it is shot. If so, however, then understanding
what is sexist about (far too much) visual pornography—indeed, under-
standing it at all—will require us to analyze it as photography or as
film (Bauer, 2015, pp. 85–6). There is plenty of excellent work along
these lines, beginning with Linda Williams’s now classic book Hardcore
(Williams, 1989). But almost none of this work seems to be known to
analytic philosophers who write about pornography.
48 Strawson claims that the question whether the King of France is bald does not arise,
since France has no king, i.e., the presupposition of the question is not satisfied.
49 Oddly enough, then, L&W’s account of what makes “Dirty Pool” objectionable seems
to have almost nothing to do with the fact that it is sexually explicit, i.e., that it is
pornography.
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Nor do I mean to deny that some people might read “Dirty Pool” not
as fantasy but as ‘realistic fiction’ (cf. Liao and Protasi, 2013). Some
such people might even ‘get the message’ that L&W think the pictorial
is trying to send. And even though I think that reading “Dirty Pool”
as realistic fiction (rather than as fantasy) would be a misreading, I
would agree that there is something irresponsible about presenting such
a fantasy without making it clear that that is what it is supposed to be:
a sexual fantasy. It is not enough for pornographers simply to insist that
their work is fantasy and to blame their audience for not appreciating
that obvious fact. Whether its producers want it to be or not, pornography
has become sex education, if only by default, and pornographers should
accept the responsibility that the freedom they so vigorously defend
brings with it.
Over on the other side of the debate, however, it is disturbing what a
poor opinion many authors seem to have of the critical capacities of ‘users’
of pornography—a dismissive term I have purposely avoided. MacKinnon
(1993, pp. 16, 17) once remarked, for example, that pornography is
“masturbation material” that “does not engage the conscious mind” and
“is antithetical to thinking”. A more nuanced view, and one that is
far more widespread, is that, as Cindy Patton (1991, p. 378) puts it,
“. . . porn has no narrative or aesthetic pleasure beyond merely ‘getting
off ’. . . ”.50 Patton goes on to argue that this (elitist) assumption is what
ultimately lies behind the prejudice that “viewers and readers interpret
‘pornographic’ material as real stories or actual, filmed sex” rather than
as fantasy. In general, however, they do not (see e.g. Loftus, 2002; Ryberg,
2015). So, if we really want to understand what they do instead, then we
need to take seriously the fact that wanting to ‘get off ’—not that there’s
anything wrong with that—is only one of the reasons people have for
engaging with pornography, which does indeed have other pleasures to
offer, some of which may be just as significant, alongside (not just instead
of) getting off (see e.g. Atwood, 2005; Smith et al., 2015).
Implicit in the foregoing, then, is a significant re-orientation: away
from questions about pornography as it is in itself—e.g., what “Dirty
Pool” presupposes—and towards questions about how people engage with
it. This is now an active research area, though also a relatively new one,
50 A sociologist best known for her writings on the AIDS epidemic, Patton was a
founding editor of one of the first erotic magazines for lesbians: Bad Attitude, which was
first published in Boston in 1984.
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and not much is yet known.51 But the research that has been done so far
is more encouraging than one might have feared. For example, a 2010
study of Swedish adolescents concluded:
Our findings suggest that most of our participants had ac-
quired the necessary skills of how to navigate in the porno-
graphic landscape in a sensible and reflective manner. The
way they reasoned about the exposure and impact of pornogra-
phy indicated that most of them had the ability to distinguish
between pornographic fantasies and narratives, on the one
hand, and real sexual interaction and relationships, on the
other. (Löfgren-Mårtenson and Månsson, 2010, p. 577)
The authors do not downplay the risk that pornography poses to those
who lack such skills—nor the risk these ‘at risk’ individuals might pose to
others. But it should be no surprise that there are healthy and unhealthy,
responsible and irresponsible, ways to engage with pornography, as
with everything else. We should find ways to encourage healthy and
responsible engagement.
Finally, I am not arguing that all pornography should be read as fan-
tasy. One might well suppose, for example, that amateur pornography in
the ‘home movie’ style is an exception (cf. Hardy, 2009). A more impor-
tant case, because it is so often emphasized by opponents of pornography,
is so-called ‘gonzo’ porn, a central feature of which is its documentary
style. It is an open question how viewers engage with gonzo, as well as
how it should be understood and analyzed. I have no opinion about how
these questions should be answered, but there is now an active literature
devoted to them, too.52 Suffice it to say, for now, that it simply does not
follow that, if viewers do not interpret gonzo as fantasy, then they must
interpret it as ‘real’, in the sense that they regard it as indicative of how
real-life sex is or should be. Whatever else gonzo may be about, it is
about sexual excess and the limits of the body: John Stagliano, who is
widely regarded as the creator of the style, once remarked that gonzo
treats sex as an extreme sport (Maina and Zecca, 2016, p. 426). Perhaps
so. But if so, then it would be as foolish for viewers to try that at home
as it would be for them to try to mimic the stunts performed at the X
Games.
51 Besides the papers mentioned in the text, see Stock (2012); Todd (2012); Barker
(2014).
52 Enrico Biasin and Federico Zecca (2016) survey some of this literature in their
introduction to an issue of Porn Studies devoted to the topic.
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